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Abstract: The relationship between public goods benefiting all group members ir-
respective of their contribution and the proportion of cooperators in the group, mod-
eled as the production function, often exhibits nonlinearity. Previous nonlinear game
theoretical models assume two discrete strategies or continuous investments. Here,
we investigate the effect of nonlinear production functions on the evolution of the
mixed strategy in finite populations. When the group size and population size be-
come comparable, cooperation is doomed irrespective of the production function.
Otherwise, nonlinear production functions may lead to a convergent evolutionary
stable strategy (CESS) or a repeller, but can’t yield the evolutionary branching in
contrast with the evolution of continuous investments. In particular, we consider
three representative families of production functions, in which most previous studied
production functions are recovered as special cases. Full defection, full coopera-
tion, a unique CESS or a unique repeller may occur for two families of production
functions including concave and convex curves even if the group size is two. How-
ever, the parameter region of each evolutionary situation exhibits a great difference
since the value of public goods produced is fixed for one class and is variable for the
other when all group members cooperate. A third class encompassing symmetrically
sigmoidal and inverse sigmoidal curves may lead to the coexistence of a CESS and
a repeller impossible for the other two classes only when group size exceeds two.
Intriguingly, the hysteresis effect is found in all these three classes. However, two
saddle-node bifurcations appear for the third class but not for the other two classes.
Key words: public goods game, nonlinear production function, mixed strategy,
adaptive dynamics
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I. INTRODUCTION1
Public goods dilemma is abundant ranging from bacteria to high advanced animal to human2
being [1–5], which describes a situation in which several players can cooperate to achieve a public3
good. A public good is a resource from which all may benefit, regardless of whether they have4
helped provide the good, such as grassland, environmental resources and peace. Public goods5
games have been widely used to model and elucidate the evolution of cooperation which is an6
enduring evolutionary intractable problem [6–20]. All group members are provided an identical7
endowment (b) that can be kept or invested in a pool and simultaneously decide to cooperate8
(invest endowment) or not (keep endowment). The key characteristic of public goods games is the9
relationship between the level of resources contributed toward the production of the public good10
and the level of the public good that is provided. This relationship is known as the production11
function [21, 22]. If all members have cooperated, the group’s payoff is maximized, yet to defect12
is always better for a given player irrespective of the group’s composition since the public good13
is nonexclusive and the contribution is costly. The social dilemmas result as the best strategy for14
players and that for a group do not coincide.15
As in the linear public goods game, the per capita benefit is assumed to increase in a linear16
fashion with the number of cooperators, i.e., each unit of resource contributed produces the same17
return [6–13]. Some previous studies have relaxed this assumption and investigated the threshold18
production function in which each player has a benefit if and only if the number of cooperators19
is above a threshold, otherwise he gets nothing [14–16]. That is to say that little or no amount of20
the public good is produced until a certain level of contributions is reached, at which point a small21
increase in the level of contributions returns a large and discontinuous amount of the public good.22
In various natural situations, the threshold production function, let alone the linear production23
function, sometimes fails to capture the nature of the production of the public good. Particularly,24
both synergy allowing per capita public good produced to increase and discounting characterizing25
decreasing pubic good produced with increasing proportion of cooperators are prevalent from26
pheromone trails to human architecture [23–30]. The synergy can be represented by the convex27
function, the first part of the sigmoidal function and the second part of the inverse sigmoidal28
function. Yet the concave function, the second part of the sigmoidal function and the first part29
of the inverse sigmoidal function perform the discounting. In economics, the standard production30
function is assumed as an S-shaped curve [31], which accelerates at the beginning of production31
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and then decelerates. The initial acceleration reflects the increasing marginal returns (i.e., synergy)32
from each additional initial contribution, while the ensuing deceleration reflects the decreasing33
marginal returns (i.e., discounting) when output limits are approached.34
Besides linear and threshold production functions, concave, convex and sigmoidal production35
functions have been investigated in evolutionary game theory [17, 18]. However all these studies36
assume a priori that the amount of the investment takes two discrete values (i.e., all or nothing) or37
varies continuously within a certain range. In real life, whether to contribute to the production of38
public goods may not be either of the above two cases but rather probabilistically change according39
to circumstances and risk orientation. Consider voting in which cooperative participants vote for40
the proposal yielding the public good benefiting all group members and bear some costs, yet41
defectors, on the contrary, vote against such proposal and bear no costs. However, in practice, few42
people vote for such proposal every time they make a vote, partly due to the maxima ‘don’t put43
eggs in a basket’. In addition, most of previous studies upon nonlinearity just proceed in infinitely44
large populations [14, 17–20]. Obviously, the realistic systems exhibit finiteness of populations.45
Although there have been already attempts to study the dynamics of public goods games in finite46
populations which assume two discrete strategies or proceed in two person games [15, 16, 35],47
the adaptive dynamics of public goods games in finite populations deserve further and intensive48
investigations.49
In this paper, we propose a general framework how nonlinear production functions affect the50
adaptive dynamics of the mixed strategy in finite populations where the mixed strategy is the prob-51
ability that players invest all and otherwise invest nothing. The adaptive dynamics are widely used52
to study the long-term evolution of continuous strategy which say that the evolution on average53
takes the population up the gradient of ‘invasion fitness’. ‘Invasion fitness’ has frequently been54
assumed to be the payoff of a single mutant, suggesting the population size is infinitely large55
[19, 20, 32, 33]. Such assumption upon “invasion fitness” has been theoretically confirmed for56
a frequency independent process [34]. In finite populations, researchers have argued that it is57
the fixation probability rather than the payoff that carries the important information for evolution58
[35–37]. In particular, we consider two classes of production functions consisting of concave and59
convex curves, one with the same value of public goods produced and the other with various values60
of public goods produced when all group members cooperate. In addition, a class of production61
functions including sigmoidal and inverse sigmoidal curves are also considered, which produce62
an identical public good when all group members cooperate. Note that some threshold production63
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functions appear in them as special cases.64
II. MODEL65
Consider a well-mixed population of size N, in which each individual is endowed with 1 and66
adopts a mixed strategy x (1 ≤ x ≤ 1). The strategy x represents the probability that a player67
cooperates, i.e., invests all his endowment 1 and the initial endowment added to his payoff is68
0, or else he defects, i.e., invests nothing and and the initial endowment added to his payoff is69
c. Sampling of individuals playing games follows a hypergeometric distribution and the average70
payoff of individuals of strategy z in a population consisting of X individuals of strategy w and71
N − X individuals of strategy z, f (z,w,N − X) (see the payoff in Appendix), is72
f (z,w,N − X) =
∑n−1
i=0
(N−X−1i )( Xn−1−i)
(N−1n−1)
∑i
k=0
∑n−1−i
l=0
(
i
k
)(
n−1−i
l
)
zk(1 − z)i−kwl(1 − w)n−1−i−l
[
zg( k+l+1
n
) + (1 − z)[g( k+l
n
) + c]
]
where n is the group size and g(θ) is the production function describing the relationship between73
the proportion of cooperators in a group and the public good produced. Clearly, g( k
n
) is the benefit74
to each member if k players apt to cooperate and n− k defect. The production function is g(θ) = rθ75
in [6–13], r f (θ − λ) in [14, 16] and rθ f (θ − λ) in [15] where r is the enhancement factor, f (x)76
satisfies f (x < 0) = 0 and f (x ≥ 0) = 1 and λ is the threshold point. Other relative studies assume77
g(θ) = r
n
(1 + w + w2 + · · · + wnθ−1) in [17] and g(θ) = r e
n
2 k+1
e
n
2 k−1
1
e−kn(θ−0.5)+1 −
1
e
n
2 k−1
in [18], where w78
and k characterize the shape of production functions. All the above production functions, without79
exception, are increasing and satisfy g(0) = 0, which are also followed in our model.80
III. RESULTS81
Following the method of the derivation in [34] (see derivation in Appendix), the first-order
deterministic approximation for the mean path of x is, ddt x(t) = C
∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x
ρ(x; y), where ρ(x; y) =
[
∑N−1
k=0
∏k
a=1
f (x,y,N−a)
f (y,x,a) ]
−1 is the fixation probability of a mutant with strategy y in a resident popu-
lation with strategy x. Note throughout this paper ∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x
ρ(x; y) means that we first calculate the
partial derivative of ρ(x; y) with respect to y and then replace y with x. Since C is a constant for
the evolutionary process and just scales time, the adaptive dynamics can be reduced to
d
dt
x(t) =
∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x
ρ(x; y) (1)
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Substituting ρ(x; y) into Eq.1 determines the evolution of the mixed strategy over evolutionary
time (see calculation in Appendix):
d
dt
x(t) = G(x) =
[
(N − n)C(x) − (N − 1)c
]
2N f (x)
, (2)
where C(x) =
∑n−1
j=0
(
n−1
j
)
x j(1 − x)n−1− j
[
g( j+1
n
) − g( j
n
)
]
and f (x) is the payoff of x in a monomor-82
phic population with x and is always positive in our model. As N → +∞, G(x) = (C(x)−c)2 f (x) =83
1
2 f (x)
∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x
f (y, x, 1), so our conclusion qualitatively recovers the dynamics used in [19, 20, 32, 33].84
Clearly the evolution of the mixed strategy x is related with the global information of the85
production function g(θ). If (N − n)C(x) > (N − 1)c, selection favors mutants with y > x replacing86
x (i.e., ρ(x; y) > 1/N with y > x), whereas if (N−n)C(x) < (N−1)c, this is only possible for mutants87
with y < x (i.e., ρ(x; y) > 1/N with y < x) [38]. In particular, whenever the group size equals the88
population size, n = N, the adaptive dynamics lead to the demise of cooperation irrespective of the89
shape of the production functions, which contrasts with the results in larger populations addressed90
later. A strategy satisfying (N − n)C(x) = (N − 1)c (i.e., ρ(y; x) = 1/N) is termed a singular91
strategy whose evolutionary direction is uncertain and further close investigations upon G′(x) and92
∂ρ2(x;y)
∂y2
∣∣∣
y=x
are needed [39], where G′(x) is the derivative of G(x) with respect to x.93
At singular points, we have (see calculation in Appendix)
G′(x) =
(n − 1)D(x)
N f (x)
,
∂ρ2(x; y)
∂y2
∣∣∣
y=x
=
(n − 1)D(x)
3N f (x)
, (3)
where D(x) =
∑n−2
j=0
(
n−2
j
)
x j(1 − x)n−2− j
[
g( j+2
n
) − 2g( j+1
n
) + g( j
n
)
]
. In principle, the evolution of the94
mixed strategy opens up the possibility of the evolutionary branching requiring G′(x) < 0 and95
∂ρ2(x;y)
∂y2
∣∣∣
y=x
> 0, which clearly never appears in such adaptive dynamics. The singular strategy96
satisfying D(x) < 0 is a convergent evolutionary stable strategy (CESS or called as h-stable in97
[33]) since G′(x) < 0 and ∂ρ
2(x;y)
∂y2
∣∣∣
y=x
< 0, where once it has become established in a population,98
no further evolutionary change is possible for small mutations. If D(x) > 0 holds at the singular99
strategy, the singular strategy is a repeller (called as x-stable in [33]) since G′(x) > 0, leading100
bistable dynamics. In the case of G′(x) = 0, the first-order deterministic approximation fails to tell101
the evolutionary evolution of such point which can be determined by the third-order deterministic102
approximation. In this case, it’s just like the adaptive dynamics yield no singular points (see103
calculation in Appendix).104
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A. Convex and concave production functions105
If g(θ) is a convex function which means D(x) > 0, G(x) = 0 has at most one root x∗ which106
satisfies D(x∗) > 0, thus there exists at most one singular strategy which, if it exists, is a repeller.107
However concave g(θ) leads to D(x) < 0 and the monotonicity of G(x), hence there exists at most108
one singular strategy which, if it exists, is a CESS. In particular, we will consider two classes of109
production functions consisting of concave and convex curves.110
Firstly, a family of production functions φm(θ) = rθm with m > 0 controlling the shape of111
production functions (Fig. 1a) are investigated. When m = 1, φm(θ) is a linear production function112
which is probed as a benchmark. When m > 1, φm(θ) is a convex curve where the amount of113
the public good produced by each additional cooperator is higher than the previous one. When114
0 < m < 1, φm(θ) is a concave curve in which each additional cooperator produces decreasing115
public goods in contrast with the case of m > 1. Particularly when m → 0 or m → +∞, φm(θ) is a116
threshold function at θ = 0 or θ = 1.117
Assume m∗1 =
ln c(N−1)
r(N−n)
ln 1
n
and m∗2 =
ln(1− c(N−1)
r(N−n) )
ln n−1
n
and a complete classification of the adaptive dynamics118
for φm(θ) is provided as follows (see analysis in Appendix):119
• The cooperative probability monotonically decreases to full defection (figure 2a) if m ∈120
[m∗1,m
∗
2] and
c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) . Moderate m and large ratio of the initial remaining endowment121
induced by defection and the enhancement factor, c
r
, commonly lead full defection to evolve122
in the initially uniform populations. The parameter region of m varies with c
r
, the population123
size N and the group size n. Increasing c
r
(figure 1b) or increasing n (figure 1d) expands the124
region, whereas increasing N (figure 1c) shrinks the region.125
• The cooperative probability monotonically increases to full cooperation (figure 2b) if m ∈126
[m∗2,m
∗
1] and
c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) . Moderate m and small
c
r
together induce full cooperation to evolve127
in the initially uniform populations. In contrast with the region of m favoring full defection,128
the parameter region of m favoring full cooperation wanes with growing c
r
(figure 1b) or129
growing n (figure 1d), yet waxes with growing N (figure 1c).130
• Under the condition of m > m∗1 and
c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) or the condition of m > m
∗
2 and
c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) ,131
a unique repeller occurs in the adaptive dynamics (figure 2c). A repeller leads to bistable132
dynamics, where the initially uniform population finally converges to full cooperation or133
full defection depending on the initial condition. The existence of the repeller requires the134
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sufficiently large m bounded by m∗1 ≥ 1 for
c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) and m
∗
2 ≥ 1 for
c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) . The135
parameter region of m is first magnified and then shortened with increasing c
r
(figure 1b),136
increasing N (figure 1c) or increasing n (figure 1d), which is maximized to all convex pro-137
duction functions of φm(θ) at cr =
N−n
n(N−1) .138
• Under the condition of m ∈ (0,m∗2) and
c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) or the condition of m ∈ (0,m
∗
1) and139
c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) , a unique CESS appears in the adaptive dynamics (figure 2d). Irrespective of the140
initial condition, the initially uniform population converges and resides in a moderate coop-141
erative probability which statistically means the coexistence of cooperators and defectors.142
In contrast with the requirement of the occurrence of a repeller, the generation of a CESS143
demands the sufficiently small m, which is bounded by m∗2 ≤ 1 for
c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) and m
∗
1 ≤ 1144
for c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) . However, similar to the parameter region yielding a repeller, growing
c
r
(fig-145
ure 1b), growing N (figure 1c) or growing n (figure 1d) first magnifies and then shortens the146
region of m yielding a CESS, which is maximized to all concave production functions of147
φm(θ) at cr =
N−n
n(N−1) .148
• Evolution un-changes the state of the initially uniform population when the linear production149
function is adopted and c
r
arrives at N−n
n(N−1) . Such result is less meaning and is no longer150
considered in our paper.151
Note when c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) satisfies, a hysteresis effect occurs in which if the population with a repeller152
initially is in the state of full cooperation and m∗1 ≤ m ≤ m
∗
2 is reached, the population will settle153
in the state of full defection and any cooperative state will not be established even if m > m∗2 again154
holds (figures 1b–d).155
Secondly, another family of production functions characterized by ψw(θ) = rn (1 + w + w
2
+156
· · · + wnθ−1) (figure 3a) are investigated, which have been adopted to consider the evolution of two157
discrete strategies in infinitely large populations [17]. The shape of such production functions158
is controlled by an exponent w and clearly they show that the first cooperator contributes r
n
to159
the public goods, the ensuing cooperator adds r
n
w to the public goods, and so on, to the last160
cooperator of nθ producing r
n
wnθ−1 of the public goods. Easily verified, ψw=1(θ) = φm=1(θ) = rnθ,161
ψw<1 similar to φm<1 is concave, and ψw>1 similar to φm>1 is convex. In particular, ψw→0 and ψm→+∞162
are threshold production functions at θ = 1/n. The difference between ψw and φm is that ψw<1 and163
φm<1 completely locate on either side of the curve ψw=1 which can also occurs for both ψw>1 and164
φm>1 when only the values of ψm(θ) at θ = 0, 1/n, · · · , 1 are considered. Additionally, the value of165
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the public goods provided when all group members cooperate (i.e., θ = 1) is variable for all ψw(θ)166
but is fixed for all φm(θ).167
Substituting ψw(θ) into Eq.2 determines the adaptive dynamics,
d
dt
x(t) = G(x) =
[ r
n
(1 + (w − 1)x)n−1 − c N−1
N−n
]
2N f (x)
.
The above five evolutionary scenarios for φm also occur for ψw. However, the parameter ranges168
corresponding to each evolutionary scenario exhibit great difference in these two families of pro-169
duction functions. Sufficiently large w (w ≥ ( cn(N−1)
r(N−n) )
1
n−1 ) in ψw navigates the direction of evolution170
to full cooperation when c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) holds, yet which demands the moderate m in φm. On con-171
trary, when c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) holds, sufficiently small w (w ≤ (
cn(N−1)
r(N−n) )
1
n−1 ) in ψw induces the direction of172
evolution to full defection yet which requires the moderate m in φm. Moreover if φm is adopted, a173
unique CESS may occur in the case of c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) and a unique repeller in the case of
c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) ,174
both of which are impossible for ψw. In deference to the adaptive dynamics for φm, the parameter175
range favoring full cooperation in ψw shrinks with growing cr (figure 3b), decreasing N (figure 3c)176
or growing n (figure 3d) which is the opposite for that favoring full defection. Different from the177
adaptive dynamics for φm, the parameter range yielding a unique repeller or a unique CESS in ψw178
only exists until some thresholds are reached and then shrinks or expands with growing c
r
(fig-179
ure 3b), decreasing N (figure 3c) or growing n (figure 3d). A hysteresis effect completely similar180
to φm also occurs in ψw.181
B. Sigmoidal or inverse sigmoidal production functions182
We have investigated the adaptive dynamics of the mixed strategy under convex and concave183
production functions which are segments of the standard S-shaped production functions. How-184
ever, the adaptive dynamics under the convex and concave production functions can’t predict185
that of sigmoidal production functions since the adaptive dynamics are related with the whole186
shape of the production function. Following we will consider sigmoidal as well as inverse sig-187
moid production functions for generality which may lead to more than one singular strategy since188
G′(0) and G′(1) have different signs. The generalized sigmoidal or inverse sigmoidal produc-189
tion functions are intractable analytically, so we illustrate the adaptive dynamics induced by spe-190
cial types, i.e., symmetrically sigmoidal and symmetrically inverse sigmoidal production func-191
tions. Specifically, symmetrically sigmoidal g(θ) (or symmetrically inverse sigmoidal g(θ)) is192
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convex (or concave) in [0, 1/2) and concave (or convex) in [1/2, 1] satisfying, ∀θ1, θ2 ≤ 1/2,193
g(θ1) − g(θ2) = −g(1 − θ1) + g(1 − θ2). Here, the adaptive dynamics yield at most two singular194
strategies 0 < x1 < 1/2 < x2 < 1, where x1 is a repeller (or a CESS) and x2 is a CESS (or a195
repeller) (see analysis in Appendix). In principle, sigmoidal or inverse sigmoidal production func-196
tions can generate between zero and two singular strategies. Moreover, there are up to six different197
dynamical scenarios since the stability of adjacent singular strategies must alternate (see analysis198
in Appendix). Due to the symmetry of such production functions, the unique singular strategy, if199
it appears, is x = 12 and satisfies G
′(x) = 0. Here, the adaptive dynamics don’t feel the existence200
of such singular strategy and perform just as the system yields no singular strategies.201
Consider a third series of production functions ϕs(θ) whose shape is characterized by the pa-
rameter s > −0.5 in figure 4a
ϕs(θ) =

r
1−(1−2θ)
1
2s+1
2 , 0 ≤ θ ≤
1
2 ,
r
1+(2θ−1)
1
2s+1
2 ,
1
2 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
(4)
Easily verified, ϕs=0(θ) = φm=1(θ) = ψw=1(θ) = rθ. In the case of s > 0, ϕs(θ) is a symmetrically202
sigmoidal function and is similar to ζk>0(θ) = ζk<0(θ) = r e
n
2 k+1
e
n
2 k−1
1
e−kn(θ−0.5)+1 −
1
e
n
2 k−1
which is also203
symmetrically sigmoid and is adopted in [18]. In the case of − 12 < s < 0, ϕs(θ) is a symmetrically204
inverse sigmoidal function. Particularly in the case of s → −0.5 or s → +∞, ϕs(θ) is a threshold205
function at θ = 0, 1 or at θ = 0.5. Note that when all group members cooperate, ϕs or φm produces206
the same public goods with varying s or m and ψw produces different public goods with varying w.207
Two evolutionary scenarios occurring in φm, cooperators eventually vanish and cooperators208
dominate the whole population, also appear in the adaptive dynamics for ϕs. Two reasons under-209
lying such evolutionary results are the absence of the interior singular strategy and the existence210
of only a unique singular strategy satisfying G′(x) = 0. The latter case never happens in the adap-211
tive dynamics for φm. Similar to the adaptive dynamics for φm, moderate s (s∗2 ≤ s ≤ s
∗
1) along212
with sufficiently small c
r
( c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) ) guarantees unidirectional evolution to full cooperation, and213
moderate s (s∗1 ≤ s ≤ s
∗
2) together with sufficiently large
c
r
( c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) ) navigates unidirectional214
evolution to full defection, where s∗1 and s
∗
2 are the solutions of G(0) = 0 and G(
1
2 ) = 0 with respect215
to s (see analysis in Appendix). Moreover, increasing c
r
, n or decreasing N shrinks the parameter216
region of s favoring full cooperation and expands the parameter region of s favoring full defection217
(figure 4b–d).218
In contrast with the adaptive dynamics for φm, two evolutionary situations yielding a unique219
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CESS and a unique repeller no longer appear in the adaptive dynamics for ϕs and two new evolu-220
tionary situations occur for ϕs as follows (see analysis in Appendix).221
• If s > s∗1 as well as
c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) holds or s > s
∗
2 as well as
c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) holds (figure 2e), a smaller222
interior repeller coexists with a larger interior CESS as compared with 12 . Full defection and223
a larger cooperative probability may be the final state of the initially uniform population up224
to the start-up condition. Such dynamics require the sufficiently large s bounded by s∗1 ≥ 0225
for c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) and s
∗
2 ≥ 0 for
c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) . The parameter region of s is first magnified and then226
shortened with increasing c
r
, N or n, and maximized to all sigmoid production functions of227
ϕs(θ) at cr =
N−n
n(N−1) (figure 4b–d).228
• If s < s∗2 as well as
c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) holds or s < s
∗
1 as well as
c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) holds (figure 2f), a229
smaller interior CESS coexists with a larger interior repeller as compared with 12 . Full coop-230
eration and a smaller cooperative probability may be the final state of the initially uniform231
population depending on the initial condition. Such dynamics require the sufficiently small232
s bounded by s∗2 ≤ 0 for
c
r
≤ N−n
n(N−1) and s
∗
1 ≤ 0 for
c
r
≥ N−n
n(N−1) . The parameter region of s is233
first magnified and then shortened with increasing c
r
, N or n, and maximized to all inverse234
sigmoid production functions of ϕs(θ) at cr =
N−n
n(N−1) (Fig.4b–d).235
Unlike the adaptive dynamics for φm, we have two saddle-node bifurcations at s∗1 and s
∗
2 (figure 4b–236
d). Here, as s initially below s∗1 (or s
∗
2) increases when
c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) (or
c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) ) holds, a smaller237
stable singular strategy and a larger unstable one first disappear and no singular strategies exist238
and then a larger stable singular strategy and a smaller unstable one are created. Moreover, the239
hysteresis effect can also be found in ϕs for cr >
N−n
n(N−1) (figure 4b–d). When s > s
∗
2, the population240
initially residing in the CESS will settle in full defection if s decreases below s∗2 and above s
∗
1.241
However even if s rises above s∗2 again, any cooperative state will not be established again. Simi-242
larly, if the population with s < s∗1 initially locates in full cooperation and s increases between s
∗
1243
and s∗2, the population will reside in full defection and only the CESS less cooperative than full244
cooperation is reached even if s returns below s∗1.245
IV. DISCUSSION246
Besides the interest in relaxing the assumption of infinitely large populations and two alterna-247
tive pure strategies in the theory of public goods games, clearly it is natural to go beyond such248
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premises and investigate the evolution of mixed strategy in finite populations. Our extensions to249
public goods games with arbitrary production functions allow a natural relation between the ben-250
efit and the number of cooperators. A linear public goods game in a group of size n is equivalent251
to n − 1 pairwise prisoner’s dilemma under some transformation [40]. However when nonlinear252
production functions are adopted, this equivalence fails and thus the public goods games are no253
longer the simple addition of several two-person games. Although the adaptive dynamics of the254
mixed strategy in two-player games have been investigated [35], the evolution in multiple players255
games still deserves deep focus and turns out to exhibit complex adaptive dynamics. In principle,256
the evolution of the mixed strategy just yields two types of singular strategies, the CESS and the257
repeller, which contrasts with the evolution of the continuously varying investment leading to the258
evolutionary branching as well as the CESS and the repeller in [19, 20]. The adaptive dynamics259
produce a repeller if a singular strategy exists when a convex production function is adopted, yet260
a CESS occurs if a singular strategy exists when a concave production is taken. Such complex261
dynamics are not only possible for multi-player public goods games but also possible for even262
two player games, unlike the results exhibited in the evolution of two alternative discrete strate-263
gies [14]. The symmetrically sigmoidal production function brings about a smaller repeller and264
a larger CESS as compared with 12 , yet the symmetrically inverse sigmoidal production function265
results into a smaller CESS and a larger repeller as compared with 12 . Such complex dynamics only266
appear in multi-player games not possible for two-player games similar to [14]. In particular, co-267
operation is doomed when the group size is equal to the population size irrespective of production268
functions, similar to the evolution of two pure strategies in finite populations [15, 16].269
The adaptive dynamics of the mixed strategy are related with the whole shape of the production270
functions. We quantitatively analyze how nonlinear production functions exert the effect on the271
evolutionary dynamics on the basis that the shape of a production function can be controlled by a272
parameter. Two classes of production functions considered φm and ψw are separately characterized273
by the parameters m and w, encompassing convex (m,w > 1), linear (m,w = 1), and concave274
curves (0 < m,w < 1). Then we take into account another family of production functions ϕs275
represented by the parameter s, including sigmoidal (s > 0), linear (s = 0), and inverse sigmoidal276
curves (0.5 < s < 0). When all group members cooperate, φm or ψw produces the same public277
good for varying m or w, yet ϕs produces different public goods for varying s. We find the vari-278
ous evolutionary scenarios are interconnected through variations of the continuous parameters the279
shape of production functions (m, s, w), the ratio of the remaining initial endowment induced by280
12
defection and the enhancement factor (c/r), the group size (n) and the population size (N), which281
seamlessly relates seemingly disparate biological situations.282
Full cooperation evolves for moderate m, moderate s, or sufficiently large w when c
r
< N−n
n(N−1)283
holds, yet for moderate m, moderate s, or sufficiently small w when c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) holds, full defection284
evolves. The unique CESS or unique repeller only occurs in φm and ψw. The occurrence of a285
unique CESS requires sufficiently small m for all c
r
but sufficiently small w only for c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) ,286
whereas a unique repeller occurs when m is sufficiently large for all c
r
but when w is sufficiently287
large only for c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) . In contrast with the adaptive dynamics exhibiting in φm and ψw, the288
adaptive dynamics emerging in ϕs reduce two evolutionary situations leading to a unique CESS or289
a unique repeller and increase two new evolutionary dynamics. A smaller repeller coexists with290
a larger CESS as compared with 12 with m above some positive value, yet with m below some291
negative value, a smaller CESS co-occurs with a larger repeller as compared with 12 .292
We found the hysteresis effect in all these three classes of production functions, where the293
population in a cooperative state will experience a sudden transition and settle in defection if some294
parameters are changed. However, a subsequent complete recovery of parameter values will not295
recover the initial cooperative state. Unlike the adaptive dynamics in φm and ψw, we have two296
saddle-node bifurcations at s∗1 and s
∗
2 in ϕs where as s initially below s
∗
1 (or s
∗
2) increases and297
c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) (or
c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) ) holds, two singular strategies, with the smaller stable and the larger298
unstable, first disappear and no singular strategies exist and then two new singular strategies are299
created, with the larger stable and the smaller unstable. In all three classes of production functions,300
the parameter region favoring full cooperation shrinks and that favoring full defection expands with301
growing c
r
, decreasing N or growing n. The parameter range leading to a unique CESS or a unique302
repeller in φm first expands and then shrinks with growing cr , N or n, similar to the parameter range303
bringing about the coexistence of a CESS and a repeller in ϕs. However in ψw, the parameter304
range yielding a unique CESS expands with growing c
r
, decreasing N or growing n, and suddenly305
diminish when c
r
=
N−n
n(N−1) is reached, which is the opposite for the parameter range producing a306
unique repeller.307
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Figure legends:391
Figure 1 Normalized production functions φm(θ)/r with m > 0 and phase diagrams illustrating different392
dynamical regimes induced by them. (a) The shape of φm(θ) is controlled by m. Convex φm(θ)393
corresponds to m > 1 (dashed), linear φm(θ) corresponds to m = 1 (solid), and concave φm(θ)394
corresponds to 0 < m < 1 (dotted). (b) For N = 100 and n = 50, the dynamics are determined by395
c/r and m. (c) Dynamics as determined by N and m for n = 50 and c/r = 0.01. (d) For N = 100396
and c/r = 0.02, the dynamics are determined by n and m. The parameter regions in (b) − −(d) are397
separated into four subregions for full cooperation, full defection, a unique repeller and a unique398
CESS by m = m∗1 (Dashed) and m = m
∗
2 (solid).399
Figure 2 Samples of evolutionary dynamics where color shades indicate higher frequencies of a strategy.400
(a and b) Unidirectional evolutionary dynamics in the absence of singular strategies in which full401
defection evolves (a) and full cooperation evolves (b). (c) A unique repeller leads the population to402
evolve to full defection or full cooperation up to the initial condition. (d) A unique CESS in which the403
population finally converges and resides. (e) The co-existence of a smaller CESS and a large repeller.404
(f) The co-occurrence of a smaller repeller and a larger CESS. Results were obtained from numerical405
simulations in Appendix. Parameters: population size N = 100, group size n = 4, mutation rate406
u = 0.001, mutation variance σ = 0.0001, and the following production functions: (a) g(θ) = 3.5 for407
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, (b) g(θ) = 5 for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, (c) g(θ) = 0 for 0 ≤ θ < 1, g(θ) = 3.5 for θ = 1, (d) g(θ) = 0408
for θ = 0, g(θ) = 3.5 for 0 < θ ≤ 1, (e) g(θ) = 0 for θ = 0, g(θ) = 1.75 for 0 < θ < 0.5 and g(θ) = 3.5409
for θ = 1, (f) g(θ) = 0 for 0 ≤ θ < 0.5, g(θ) = 1.75 for θ = 0.5 and g(θ) = 3.5 for 0.5 < θ ≤ 1.410
Figure 3 Normalized production functions ψw(θ)/r with w > 0 and phase diagrams illustrating different411
dynamical regimes induced by them. (a) The shape of ψw(θ) is controlled by m. Convex ψw(θ) corre-412
sponds to w > 1 (dashed), linear ψw(θ) corresponds to w = 1 (solid) and concave ψw(θ) corresponds413
to 0 < w < 1 (dotted). (b) For N = 100 and n = 50, the dynamics are determined by c/r and w. (c)414
Dynamics as determined by N and w for n = 50 and c/r = 0.01. (d) For N = 100 and c/r = 0.02, the415
dynamics are determined by n and w. The parameter regions in (b)−−(d) are separated into four sub-416
regions for full cooperation, full defection, a unique repeller and a unique CESS by w = ( cn(N−1)
r(N−n) )
1
n−1417
(solid) and c
r
=
N−n
n(N−1) (dashed).418
Figure 4 Normalized production functions ϕs(θ)/r with s > −0.5 and phase diagrams illustrating different419
17
dynamical regimes induced by them. (a) The shape of ϕs(θ) is controlled by s. Symmetrically inverse420
sigmoidal ϕs(θ) corresponds to −0.5 < s < 0 (dashed), linear ϕs(θ) corresponds to s = 0 (solid) and421
symmetrically sigmoidal ϕs(θ) corresponds to s > 0 (dotted). (b) For N = 100 and n = 50, the422
dynamics are determined by c/r and s. (c) Dynamics as determined by N and s for n = 50 and423
c/r = 0.01. (d) For N = 100 and c/r = 0.02, the dynamics are determined by n and s. The424
parameter regions in (b)–(d) are separated into four subregions for full cooperation, full defection,425
the coexistence of a smaller repeller and a large CESS and the co-occurrence of a smaller CESS and426
a larger repeller by s = s∗1 (solid) and s = s
∗
2 (dashed).427
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APPENDIX A: THE PAYOFF428
If the population consists of X individuals of strategy w and N −X individuals of strategy z, a z strategist429
engages a group consisting of i individuals of strategy z and n − 1 − i individuals of strategy w in its n − 1430
interactive partners with the probability H(i, n − 1,N − X − 1,N − 1)
def
=
(N−X−1i )(
X
n−1−i)
(N−1n−1)
. Here a z strategist431
encounters k cooperators and i−k defectors from strategy z, and l cooperators and n−1− i− l defectors from432
strategy w with the probability
(
i
k
)(
n−1−i
l
)
zk(1 − z)i−kwl(1 − w)n−1−i−l. It follows that the average payoff to433
strategy z, P(z,w, i+ 1), in a group having i+ 1 individuals of strategy z and n− 1− i individuals of strategy434
w is P(z,w, i + 1) =
∑i
k=0
∑n−1−i
l=0
(
i
k
)(
n−1−i
l
)
zk(1 − z)i−kwl(1 − w)n−1−i−l
[
zg( k+l+1
n
) + (1 − z)[g( k+l
n
) + c]
]
. Here435
g(x) is the production function, describing the relationship between the proportion of cooperators in a group436
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and the public good produced, which is an increasing function and satisfies g(0) = 0. Taking the weighted437
average over all possible numbers of strategy z’s individuals in the interactive partners with the weights438
given by the probability H(i, n − 1,N − X − 1,N − 1), yields the average payoff of individuals of strategy z439
in a population consisting of X individuals of strategy w and N − X individuals of strategy z, f (z,w,N − X),440
f (z,w,N − X) =
∑n−1
i=0 H(i, n − 1,N − X − 1,N − 1)P(z,w, i + 1).441
APPENDIX B: THE DERIVATION OF THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS IN FINITE POPULA-442
TIONS443
We adopt the frequency dependent Moran process to update the mixed strategy. In each time step, all444
individuals initially compete to reproduce an offspring. The probability that each individual reproduces445
is proportional to his payoff. With probability u, the offspring inherits the strategy of his parent. With446
complementary probability 1 − u, a mutant y emerges whose strategy obeys a symmetric probability dis-447
tribution with the parent strategy as mean and with the variance denoted by σ. Subsequently, a randomly448
chosen individual is replaced by the offspring. Therefore, the population size N remains constant during the449
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evolutionary process.450
The principle of mutual exclusion says that two adaptive strategies cannot coexist indefinitely in the
population when not renewed by mutations. We assume that the mutation rate u is sufficiently small so that
the mutant strategy or the resident strategy reaches fixation before a new mutant occurs. In the long term,
there is only a single strategy prevailing in the population at almost any point in time and the evolutionary
process can be envisaged a sequence of strategy substitutions. Let p(x, t) be the probability that the strategy
in the population is x at the time t. By virtue of the Markov property,
d
dt
p(x, t) =
∫
[w(x, y)p(y, t) − w(y, x)p(x, t)]dy, (B1)
where w(y, x) is the transition probability per unit time for the strategy substitution x → y. Since mutation451
and selection are uncorrelated, w(y, x) = µNM(y)ρ(x; y) where ρ(x; y) is the fixation probability of a mutant452
y in a resident population x.453
The mean path of the strategy substitutions is denoted by 〈x〉(t) and defined as
〈x〉(t) =
∫
xp(x, t)dx.
Neglecting the order of integration and differential, we can obtain the dynamics of the mean path from
Eq.(B1)
d
dt
〈x〉(t) =
∫
x
d
dt
p(x, t)dx = 〈a1(x)〉(t),
where a1(x) =
∫
(y − x)w(y, x)dy. On the condition that the derivations of the stochastic realizations from
the mean path are relatively small which means that the variance of the mutation process is sufficient small,
the above equation can be approximated as
d
dt
〈x〉(t) = a1(〈x〉)(t) =
∫
(y − 〈x〉)w(y, 〈x〉)dy = µN
∫
(y − 〈x〉)M(y)ρN(〈x〉; y)dy.
Using the first-order approximation of the fixation probability and the symmetry of the mutation, we obtain
the dynamics of the mean path
d
dt
〈x〉(t) = C0
∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=〈x〉
ρN(〈x〉; y), (B2)
where C0 is a constant which reflects the populations size and the mutation process. Using the third-order
approximation of the fixation probability, we obtain the dynamics of the mean path
d
dt
〈x〉(t) = C1
∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=〈x〉
ρ(〈x〉; y) +C2
∂3
∂y3
∣∣∣∣
y=〈x〉
ρN(〈x〉; y), (B3)
where C1 and C2 are constants which reflect the populations size and the mutation process. Note the bracket454
denoting the mean will ceased using for simplicity in main texts.455
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APPENDIX C: THE CALCULATION OF THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS IN OUR MODEL456
The payoff of y f (y, x, a) and the payoff of x f (x, y,N − a) in a population with a individuals of y and
N − a individuals of x are
f (y, x, a) =
∑n−1
i=0 H(i, n − 1, a − 1,N − 1)
∑i
k=0
∑n−1−i
l=0
(
i
k
)(
n−1−i
l
)
yk(1 − y)i−kxl(1 − x)n−1−i−l
[
yg( k+l+1
n
) + (1 − y)(g( k+l
n
) + c)
]
,
f (x, y,N − a) =
∑n−1
i=0 H(i, n − 1,N − a − 1,N − 1)
∑i
k=0
∑n−1−i
l=0
(
i
k
)(
n−1−i
l
)
xk(1 − x)i−kyl(1 − y)n−1−i−l
[
xg( k+l+1
n
) + (1 − x)(g( k+l
n
) + c)
]
.
The calculations of the first, second or third order partial derivatives of ρ(x; y) can be transformed into those
of f (y, x, a) and f (x, y,N − a),
∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x
f (y, x, a) =
(a − 1)(n − 1) + N − 1
N − 1
C(x) − c,
∂2
∂y2
∣∣∣∣
y=x
f (y, x, a) =
(a − 1)(n − 1)[(a − 2)(n − 2) + 2(N − 2)]
(N − 1)(N − 2)
D(x),
∂3
∂y3
∣∣∣∣
y=x
f (y, x, a) =
(a − 1)(a − 2)(n − 1)(n − 2)[(a − 3)(n − 3) + 3(N − 3)]
(N − 1)(N − 2)(N − 3)
A(x),
∂
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x
f (x, y,N − a) =
a(n − 1)
N − 1
C(x),
∂2
∂y2
∣∣∣∣
y=x
f (x, y,N − a) =
a(a − 1)(n − 1)(n − 2)
(N − 1)(N − 2)
D(x),
∂3
∂y3
∣∣∣∣
y=x
f (x, y,N − a) =
a(a − 1)(a − 2)(n − 1)(n − 2)(n − 3)
(N − 1)(N − 2)(N − 3)
A(x).
where
C(x) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
n − 1
j
)
x j(1 − x)n−1− j
[
g(
j + 1
n
) − g(
j
n
)
]
,
D(x) =
n−2∑
j=0
(
n − 2
j
)
x j(1 − x)n−2− j
[
g(
j + 2
n
) − 2g(
j + 1
n
) + g(
j
n
)
]
,
A(x) =
n−3∑
j=0
(
n − 3
j
)
x j(1 − x)n−3− j
[
g(
j + 3
n
) − 3g(
j + 2
n
) + 3g(
j + 1
n
) − g(
j
n
)
]
.
Adopting the first-order deterministic approximation for ρ(x; y), the adaptive dynamics are,457
x˙ = G(x) =
∂
∂y
∣∣∣
y=x
ρ(x; y) =
(N − n)C(x) − c(N − 1)
2N f (x)
.
At singular points, we have
G
′
(x) =
(n − 1)(N − n)D(x)
2N f (x)
,
∂2
∂y2
∣∣∣
y=x
ρ(x; y) =
(n − 1)(N − n)D(x)
3N f (x)
.
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For singular points satisfying D(x) whose evolutionary direction the first-order deterministic approximation458
fails to tell, employing the third-order deterministic approximation for ρ(x; y), we have459
x′(t) =
∂3
∂y3
∣∣∣∣
y=x
ρ(x; y) =
(n − 1)(n − 2)(N − n)A(x)
4N f (x)
Here, the adaptive dynamics at x∗ is obviously directional and it’s just like the adaptive dynamics yield no460
singular points since A(x) is the derivative of D(x).461
APPENDIX D: THE ANALYSIS OF φm(θ)462
Consider a family of production functions φm(θ) = rθm where m > 0 is an exponent controlling the463
shape of production functions. When m = 1, φm(θ) is a linear production function where for all x ∈ [0, 1],464
G(x) > 0 if c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) , G(x) = 0 if
c
r
=
N−n
n(N−1) and G(x) < 0 if
c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) . φm>1(θ) leads to D(x) > 0, thus465
G(x)|m>1 has a minimum at x = 0 and a maximum at x = 1, conversely φ0<m<1(θ) leads to D(x) < 0, thus466
G(x)|0<m<1 has a minimum at x = 1 and a maximum at x = 0. Let m∗1 and m
∗
2 be the solutions of G(0) = 0467
and G(1) = 0 with respect to m, which are given by m∗1 =
ln c(N−1)
r(N−n)
ln 1
n
and m∗2 =
ln(1− c(N−1)
r(N−n) )
ln n−1
n
,468
• For c
r
> N−1
n(N−n) , we have G(x)
∣∣∣
m=1 < 0 for x ∈ [0, 1] and m
∗
1 < 1 < m
∗
2:469
Since G(0)
∣∣∣
m>1 < G(0)
∣∣∣
m=1 < 0 and G(1)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 < G(1)
∣∣∣
m=1 < 0, both G(x)
∣∣∣
m>1 and G(x)
∣∣∣
0<m<1470
have negative minima. According to the sign of G(1)
∣∣∣
m>1 or the sign of G(0)
∣∣∣
0<m<1, G(x)
∣∣∣
m>1 = 0 or471
G(x)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 = 0 has one or no root.472
• For c
r
< N−1
n(N−n) , we have G(x)
∣∣∣
m=1 > 0 for x ∈ [0, 1] and m
∗
2 < 1 < m
∗
1.:473
Since G(1)
∣∣∣
m>1 > G(1)
∣∣∣
m=1 > 0 and G(0)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 > G(0)
∣∣∣
m=1 > 0, both G(x)
∣∣∣
m>1 and G(x)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 have474
positive maxima. According to the sign of G(0)
∣∣∣
m>1 or G(1)
∣∣∣
0<m<1, G(x)
∣∣∣
m>1 = 0 or G(x)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 = 0475
has one or no root.476
• For c
r
=
N−1
n(N−n) , we have G(x)
∣∣∣
m=1 = 0 for x ∈ [0, 1] and m
∗
1 = 1 = m
∗
2:477
G(x)
∣∣∣
m>1 = 0 has one interior root since G(0)
∣∣∣
m>1 < G(0)
∣∣∣
m=1 = 0 and G(1)
∣∣∣
m>1 > G(1)
∣∣∣
m=1 = 0. And478
G(x)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 = 0 has one interior root since G(0)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 > G(0)
∣∣∣
m=1 = 0 and G(1)
∣∣∣
0<m<1 < G(1)
∣∣∣
m=1 =479
0.480
APPENDIX E: THE STABILITY OF TWO ADJACENT SINGULAR POINTS ALTERNATES481
We assume two adjacent singular points denoted by x∗1 and x
∗
2 hold for G
′(x) > 0.482
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• If G′(x) ≥ 0 holds for all x ∈ (x∗1, x
∗
2), G(x
∗
2) > G(x
∗
1) = 0 contradicts with the singularity of x
∗
2.483
• If there exists x ∈ (x∗1, x
∗
2) satisfying G
′(x) < 0, then one of the following three possible cases occurs,484
G(x∗2) > G(x
∗
1) = 0, G(x
∗
2) < G(x
∗
1) = 0 or G(x
∗
2) = G(x
∗
1) = 0. In the first two cases, it is obvious that485
contradiction results, the third case leads to the emergence of another singular point and contradiction486
results again.487
Similarly, contradiction will result if G
′
(x∗1) < 0 and G
′
(x∗2) < 0. Therefore, we can clam that G
′
(x∗1) and488
G
′
(x∗2) have different signs and the stability of two adjacent singular points alternates.489
APPENDIX F: THE ANALYSIS OF SYMMETRICALLY SIGMOIDAL OR INVERSE SIG-490
MOIDAL g(s)491
The expression of D(x) can be transformed into D(x) =
∑k−1
j=0
(
n−2
j
)
x j(1 − x) j[(1 − x)n−2−2 j −492
xn−2−2 j][g( j+2
n
) − 2g( j+1
n
) + g( j
n
)] where k = n−22 holds for even n or k =
n−1
2 holds for odd n.493
• Symmetrically sigmoidal g(θ) is convex in [0, 1/2) and concave in [1/2, 1] satisfying, ∀θ1, θ2 ≤ 1/2,494
g(θ1) − g(θ2) = −g(1 − θ1) + g(1 − θ2). It is easy to see that D(1/2) = 0, D(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, 1/2)495
and D(x) < 0 for x ∈ (1/2, 1]. There exist at almost two singular strategies 0 ≤ x1 < 1/2 < x2 ≤ 1,496
where x1 is a repeller and x2 is a CESS.497
• Symmetrically inverse sigmoidal g(θ) is concave in [0, 1/2) and convex in [1/2, 1] satisfying,498
∀θ1, θ2 ≤ 1/2, g(θ1) − g(θ2) = −g(1 − θ1) + g(1 − θ2). It is easy to see that D(1/2) = 0,499
D(x) < 0 for x ∈ [0, 1/2) and D(x) > 0 for x ∈ (1/2, 1]. There exist almost two singular strate-500
gies 0 ≤ x1 < 1/2 < x2 ≤ 1, where x1 is a CESS and x2 is a repeller.501
APPENDIX G: THE ANALYSIS OF ϕs(θ)502
Consider a series of production functions ϕs(θ) whose shape is characterized by the parameter s > −0.5
ϕs(θ) =

r
1−(1−2θ)
1
2s+1
2 , 0 ≤ θ ≤
1
2 ,
r
1+(2θ−1)
1
2s+1
2 ,
1
2 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
(G1)
In the case of s = 0, the production function ϕs(θ) is a linear function. Just as the aforementioned, G(x) > 0503
holds for x ∈ [0, 1] if c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) , G(x) = 0 holds for x ∈ [0, 1] if
c
r
=
N−n
n(N−1) and G(x) < 0 holds for x ∈ [0, 1]504
if c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) . The expression of D(x) can be transformed into D(x) =
∑k−1
j=0
(
n−2
j
)
x j(1 − x) j[(1 − x)n−2−2 j −505
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xn−2−2 j][g( j+2
n
) − 2g( j+1
n
) + g( j
n
)] where k = n−22 holds for even n or k =
n−1
2 holds for odd n. In the case of506
s > 0, ϕs(θ) is a symmetrically sigmoidal function and results into G′(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, 1/2) and G′(x) < 0507
for x ∈ (1/2, 1], thus G(x) has a maximum at x = 1/2 and a minimum at x = 0 along with x = 1. In the case508
of −0.5 < s < 0, ϕs(θ) is a symmetrically inverse sigmoid function and results in G′(x) < 0 for x ∈ [0, 1/2)509
and G′(x) > 0 for x ∈ (1/2, 1], thus G(x) has a minimum at x = 1/2 and a maximum at x = 0 along with510
x = 1. The solutions of G(0) = 0 and G(12 ) = 0 with respect to s are denoted by s
∗
1 and s
∗
2, where the explicit511
expression of s∗1 is s
∗
1 =
ln(1− 2
n
)
2 ln(1−2 c
r
N−1
N−n
)
− 12 . The explicit expression of s
∗
2 is difficult to obtain for general n,512
whereas we have s∗2 =
ln 12
2 ln 4 c
r
N−1
N−4−
1
2
− 12 for n = 4. Note that ϕs(θ) − ϕ0(θ) = ϕ0(1 − θ) − ϕs(1 − θ) holds513
for any θ < 1/2, so we have 2n−1[G(12 )
∣∣∣∣
s=s1
− G(12 )
∣∣∣∣
s=0
]
= 2
∑k−1
j=0
[(
n−1
j
)
−
(
n−1
j+1
)] [
ϕs1(
j+1
n
)−ϕ0(
j+1
n
)
]
where514
k = n−22 holds for even n or k =
n−1
2 holds for odd n. Easily verified, we have G(1/2)
∣∣∣
0.5<s<0 < G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s=0515
and G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s>0 > G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s=0.516
• If c
r
> N−n
n(N−1) holds, we get G(x)
∣∣∣
s=0 < 0 for x ∈ [0, 1] and s
∗
1 < 0 < s
∗
2:517
Due to G(0)
∣∣∣
s>0 < G(0)
∣∣∣
s=0 < 0 and G(1/2)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 < G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s=0 < 0, both the minimum of G(x)
∣∣∣
s>0518
and the minimum of G(x)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 are negative. G(x)
∣∣∣
s>0 = 0 or G(x)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 = 0 has two, one or no519
roots by the signs of G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s>0 and G(0)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0.520
• If c
r
< N−n
n(N−1) holds, we get G(x)
∣∣∣
s=0 > 0 for x ∈ [0, 1] and s
∗
2 < 0 < s
∗
1:521
Due toG(1/2)
∣∣∣
s>0 > G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s=0 > 0 andG(0)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 > G(0)
∣∣∣
s=0 > 0, both the maximum ofG(x)
∣∣∣
s>0522
and the maximum of G(x)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 are positive. G(x)
∣∣∣
s>0 = 0 or G(x)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 = 0 has two, one or no523
roots by the signs of G(0)
∣∣∣
s>0 and G(1/2)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0.524
• If c
r
=
N−n
n(N−1) holds, we get G(x)
∣∣∣
s=0 = 0 for x ∈ [0, 1] and s
∗
2 = 0 = s
∗
1:525
Due to G(0)
∣∣∣
s>0 < G(0)
∣∣∣
s=0 = 0 and G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s>0 > G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s=0 = 0, G(x)
∣∣∣
s>0 = 0 has two roots. Due to526
G(0)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 > G(0)
∣∣∣
s=0 = 0 and G(1/2)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 < G(1/2)
∣∣∣
s=0 = 0, G(x)
∣∣∣
−0.5<s<0 = 0 has two roots.527
APPENDIX H: SIMULATION.528
The population of size N is initialized with a homogeneous state. We asynchronously update the pop-529
ulation by replacing a random focal individual α with an offspring as follows. The payoff of the focal530
individual α, Fα, is determined by randomly choosing an n-person interaction including the focal individual531
α. Then a reference individual β differing from a is randomly chosen, whose payoff, Fβ, is obtained by532
another random n-person interaction. The focal individual α takes on the parent role with the probability533
25
w =
Fα−Fβ
c
(c guarantees w ≤ 1), otherwise the reference individual β does so. The offspring stays the same534
strategy with the parent without mutation. If a mutant emerges (with the probability µ), the strategy of the535
offspring follows a Gaussian distribution with the parent strategy as mean and with a very small standard536
variance σ. We trace realistic trajectories of all individuals in a population. It has been rigorously proved537
that this evolutionary process converges in law to the solution of the adaptive dynamics [41], as the distribu-538
tion variance of mutation steps goes to zero. Therefore, with a sufficiently small mutation variance, a single539
realization can represent the average evolution of the population.540
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